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3I.   INTRODUCTION 
As the U.S. economic outlook strengthens, the Federal Reserve will continue to gradually 
normalize its monetary stance. After several years of policy rates at the zero lower bound, the 
deployment of unconventional asset purchase policies, and long-term rates and term 
premiums at historically low levels, many market analysts and policymakers were anxious 
about the global implications of the first Fed hike in more than 9 years. In the event, the first 
decision to increase the federal funds rate on December 16th, 2015, turned out to be relatively 
benign. Central banks with pegs to the U.S. dollar followed the Fed’s increase in lock-step, 
and several central banks in Latin America have also raised their policy rates substantially in 
the following months. However, there is little evidence of generalized policy rate adjustments 
elsewhere (Figure 1, panel A). Meanwhile, longer-term interest rates have remained low, 
with the U.S. term premium compressing further from already low levels (Figure 1, panel B). 
The full cycle of U.S. monetary policy tightening will take place over an extended period, 
progressing from the gradual increase of policy rates to the eventual unwinding of the 
Federal Reserve’s balance sheet. While it is expected to accompany an ongoing economic 
recovery, the process risks triggering disruptions in global financial markets. First, Federal 
Reserve rate decisions at the early stages of the tightening cycle may lead agents to revise 
their expectations about the future path of U.S. short-term rates—which currently anticipate a 
very gradual pace of adjustment—leading to spikes in longer-term yields. Second, the 
unprecedented nature of the process could generate uncertainty about the future rate path of 
interest rates and increased risk aversion, both drivers of global term premiums and capital 
flows. 
What may be the consequences for interest rates around the world as U.S. monetary policy 
continues to normalize? Does monetary tightening in the United States have a smaller impact 
on interest rates in other countries when it reflects good news about the U.S. economy? What 
are the global effects of shifts in the U.S. term premium? How do the implications from 
changes in U.S. rates compare with those originating in other major economies, such as the 
euro area? What policies can grant small open economies control over their monetary stance 
in the face of tightening global financial conditions? 
This paper attempts to address these questions by exploring international financial linkages in 
a broad sample of 43 emerging and advanced economies since the early 2000s.1 We begin by 
analyzing the pass-through of international interest rates for short and long-dated bonds. On 
average, we find a modest response of short term domestic rates to a change in the federal 
funds rate—with a 100-basis-point increase in U.S. rates leading to a response of about 20 
basis points abroad—but with substantial heterogeneity across countries. The degree of 
interest rate interdependence is much higher and more homogenous across countries in the 
case of long-term rates. When 10-year U.S. bond yields rise by 100 basis points, domestic 
long-term rates increase by between 50 and 80 basis points in two-thirds of the countries in 
our sample. 
1 This paper broadens the analysis presented in IMF (2015), which focused on emerging economies in Latin 
America and the Caribbean. 
4We then investigate whether the underlying drivers of interest rate movements in major 
economies determine their impact on interest rates in other countries. To do so, we use a 
decomposition of movements in U.S. and euro area 10-year bond yields that distinguishes the 
components that respond to economic news, those that don’t, and those movements that are 
due to changes in risk aversion, and analyze how each are transmitted across borders. We 
find that monetary policy shocks in large economies that do not reflect a change in their 
economic outlook have historically played a key role among external drivers of domestic 
long-term interest rates in small open economies. 
Figure 1. Recent interest rate developments 
A. Monetary policy rates in selected economies 
(Change between June 2015 and June 2016; percentage points) 
B. U.S. interest rates 
(percentage points) 
Sources: Haver Analytics; Bloomberg. For Saudi Arabia (SAU), the reverse repo rate is shown, provided by 
the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency. Estimates of the term premium are provided by the Federal Reserve 
Bank of New York using the methodology in Adrian, Crump, and Moench (2013). 
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A distinctive feature at the current juncture is that the U.S. term premium has been at 
historically low levels for some time (see Figure 1, panel B). To shed light on the possible 
consequences of a sudden decompression, we consider a decomposition of movements in 10-
year U.S. bond yields into shifts in the expected path of future short-term policy rates and in 
the term premium, and explore the differential impact these have on long-term interest rates 
elsewhere. We find that shocks to the U.S. term premium explain the bulk of the variability 
in long-term interest rates in small open economies that is attributable to changes in U.S. 
interest rates. 
 
The normalization of U.S. monetary policy finds many economies operating below potential 
amid a persistent deceleration in economic activity. In many cases, central banks should in 
principle be able to attenuate the domestic impact of tightening global financial conditions by 
maintaining short-term interest rates accommodative. Whether they can do so in practice is 
subject to significant disagreement in policy circles and in the literature.2 There is a 
widespread perception that the normalization of the U.S. monetary stance will be followed by 
interest rate increases in many countries, irrespective of their cyclical position. Indeed, 
international interest rates co-move strongly with external financial conditions, and with U.S. 
policy rates in particular. 
 
In a highly integrated global financial system, will monetary authorities around the world be 
able to avoid a tightening of financial conditions that is not warranted by their domestic 
cycle? Or will tightening alongside the Federal Reserve become a necessity? What policies 
can help monetary authorities regain more autonomy vis-à-vis global financial shocks?  
 
Caceres, Carrière-Swallow, and Gruss (2016) argue that inference about monetary autonomy 
based on estimates of interest rate spillovers can lead us to overstate the limits to monetary 
autonomy when business cycles are correlated across countries. The starting point of their 
analysis is the idea that countries facing similar shocks should be expected to respond with 
similar monetary policies, even if these are completely inward-looking. They propose a two-
stage procedure to estimate autonomy-impairing spillovers from global financial conditions, 
which are defined as the subset of responses of domestic rates to foreign shocks that are 
above and beyond what can be explained by the central bank’s pursuit of domestic monetary 
objectives. 
 
We follow this approach to infer limits to monetary autonomy in a sample of more than 40 
advanced and emerging economies since the early 2000s. In order to partial out the policy 
response to changes in domestic macroeconomic conditions, we start by modeling inward-
looking policy reaction functions for each country. In a second stage, we estimate whether 
the changes in domestic interest rates that are not endogenous reactions to changes in local 
macroeconomic conditions may have been driven by U.S. interest rates. We find that a 
majority of countries in our sample have managed to tailor their monetary stance to domestic 
                                                 
2 The debate on the ability of open economies to implement autonomous monetary policies in the context of a 
highly integrated global financial system has intensified recently. See, for instance, Rey (2015), Obstfeld 
(2015), and Caceres, Carrière-Swallow, and Gruss (2016). 
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conditions. However, in some cases, monetary conditions did tend to deviate from domestic 
objectives following movements in U.S. interest rates. 
 
We then analyze the determinants of autonomy-impairing spillover estimates across 
countries, focusing on the policies that can be used to enhance monetary autonomy. In line 
with the classical monetary trilemma, we find that exchange rate flexibility plays a key role 
in ensuring that central banks in open economies can gear monetary policy towards 
stabilizing the domestic economy. But other policies can also affect monetary autonomy. We 
find that stronger monetary and fiscal credibility, an active use of reserve requirements, and 
lower financial dollarization, are also associated with increased monetary autonomy. 
 
Throughout our analysis, we focus on the effects of U.S. monetary policy normalization on 
global interest rates. Of course, many other dimensions of its potential repercussions are 
worth exploring. Recent studies have argued that a global financial cycle—largely but not 
exclusively driven by U.S. monetary policy—affects asset prices, capital flows, and credit 
growth across countries (e.g., Rey, 2015). Where monetary transmission is incomplete, this 
could well be the case even where central banks have full autonomy to influence short-term 
rates. For instance, overall credit growth may be significantly influenced by global financial 
conditions if domestic firms finance their activities by issuing bonds abroad. These are all 
interesting dimensions of monetary policy transmission in open economies, but they go 
beyond the scope of this paper. 
 
The structure of the paper is as follows: Section II presents the data used in the analysis. 
Section III describes the empirical methodology and presents estimates of pass-through from 
U.S. to domestic interest rates. Section IV digs deeper into what can be expected from the 
normalization of U.S. monetary policy by exploring how the pass-through depends on the 
nature of the factors driving U.S. interest rate movements. Section V moves from interest rate 
pass-through to spillovers, and discusses the monetary autonomy that countries enjoy to 
decouple their policies from rising U.S. rates. Section VI explores which factors may 
improve the degree of monetary policy autonomy in small open economies, and Section VII 
concludes. 
 
II.   DATA 
 
Financial conditions are determined by the price and quantities of a broad set of financial 
instruments, including debt and equity. We limit our analysis to interest rates on nominal 
public debt instruments denominated in local currency that are traded on secondary markets. 
At the short end of the yield curve, we focus on instruments with remaining maturity between 
three and six months, and at the long end of the curve, with remaining maturity of 10 years. 
When government bond yields are not available, quasi-sovereign bonds issued by the central 
bank for monetary policy operations are used. 
 
Our choice of bond yields rather than monetary policy or money market rates is motivated by 
two considerations. First, long time series of policy rates are often discontinuous, as the 
choice of policy instrument changes over time.3 Second, while money market rates are 
                                                 
3 For instance, Chile shifted its policy rate from a real (inflation-indexed) rate to a nominal rate in August 2001. 
7widely available and are typically more comparable across countries, they are subject to 
time-varying volatility that is unrelated to monetary policy, which is particularly pronounced 
among emerging economies with less developed financial systems. For instance, sudden 
liquidity shortages can lead to very large spikes in nominal rates despite monetary policy 
having remained unchanged. 
One limitation of using yields on public debt is that the data are often subject to gaps. To 
overcome this limitation and in the hope of using a panel that is as balanced as possible, we 
interpolate the series using the variability in yields for instruments of similar maturities. For 
short-term rates, we use instruments with remaining maturities between one month and two 
years, and for long-term rates, we use remaining maturities between five and 20 years. Our 
primary data sources are generic bond estimates provided by Bloomberg and the series for 
treasury bills and government bond yields provided by the IMF’s International Financial 
Statistics. While sources vary by country, instrument and time period, we supplement these 
primary sources with data from the IMF’s monetary surveys, Haver Analytics, Global 
Financial Data, and national authorities.4 The result is a comprehensive database of interest 
rates for a set of 43 emerging and advanced countries, at monthly frequency from January 
2000 through October 2015. 
III. PASS-THROUGH FROM U.S. TO DOMESTIC INTEREST RATES
How are changes in global or U.S. financial conditions transmitted to interest rates in other 
economies? We estimate a set of country-specific vector autoregression (VAR) models using 
monthly data since the early 2000s to quantify the reaction of domestic interest rates to 
changes in U.S. interest rates. These estimates should be interpreted as correlations between 
interest rates, or pass-through, and are intended to provide a sense of how rates have moved 
together in the past without implying causality or limits to monetary policy autonomy. 
Our analysis is largely focused on the effects of changes in U.S. interest rates, as these are a 
key driver of global financial conditions (see, for instance, Rey, 2015 and Ricci and Shi, 
2016). In section IV, we consider alternative model specifications that include financial 
conditions in the euro area. 
Our workhorse model is a VAR that includes a small open economy block exogeneity 
assumption, such that lags of domestic conditions do not affect the external variables. The 
model can be written as: 
ቂࢠ∗∆݅ቃ௧ ൌ ࡮଴ ൅ ∑ ࡮௝
ଶ௝ୀଵ ቂࢠ
∗
∆݅ቃ௧ି௝ ൅ ቂ
࢜∗
ݒ ቃ௧, (1) 
where ݅ denotes domestic interest rates in the small open economy (short or long-term rates, 
depending on the question) and the vector ࢠ∗ includes changes in U.S. interest rates (∆݅∗, 
either the federal funds rate or the 10-year Treasury bond yield, depending on the question) 
4 See Annex B for further details of index construction, and country-level data sources. 
8as well as global risk sentiment proxied by the VIX index.5 The reduced-form error terms ݒ 
and ࢜∗ are assumed to be independent and identically distributed with bounded second 
moments. The matrices ࡮௝ are restricted to ensure the block exogeneity of ࢠ௧∗, such that 
global variables are not affected by lags of domestic variables. 
We focus our analysis on the cumulative Cholesky-orthogonalized impulse response of 
domestic interest rates (∆݅) to a shock in U.S. rates (∆݅∗).6 This timing restriction assigns 
exogeneity to movements in U.S. monetary policy—an assumption that is likely invalid in a 
context of common global shocks that may have been driving both U.S. and domestic rates 
simultaneously. 
Short-term interest rates 
Table 1 (first column) reports pass-through estimates for our full sample of 43 countries. It 
shows the cumulative response of the domestic short-term rate 12 months after a shock that 
raises the Federal Funds rate by 100-basis-points over the same period. The median response 
for the set of emerging markets is 14 basis points, while the median response for advanced 
economies is 23 basis points. These statistics mask a good deal of heterogeneity: domestic 
short-term rates react quite differently across countries to movements in the federal funds 
rate. 
Only 11 countries in our sample—just over one quarter—exhibit a cumulative response that 
is statistically significant after 12 months at the 10 percent confidence level. Interestingly, 
these countries are also rather heterogeneous, including both developing and advanced 
economies, as well as countries with both fixed and flexible exchange rates with respect to 
the dollar. The magnitude of their responses also varies greatly across economies. For 
instance, a 100-basis-point hike in the federal funds rate is met by a relatively large increase 
in short-term interest rates in Mexico and Hong Kong SAR (89 basis points and 65 basis 
points, respectively). The response to the same shock in Switzerland and Thailand is about 30 
basis points, and only five basis points in the case of Japan. 
Long-term interest rates 
Movements in short-term rates are only part of the story, since many economic decisions are 
driven by longer-term rates. Moreover, since the policy rate in the United States hit the zero 
lower bound during the global financial crisis, the Federal Reserve has conducted monetary 
policy by influencing the longer end of the yield curve through quantitative easing and 
forward guidance. Furthermore, the degree of control that central banks exert over short-term 
interest rates in their respective countries may be substantially greater than their control over 
longer-term rates. 
5 Chen, Mancini-Griffoli, and Sahay (2014) find that the VIX may amplify or dampen the effects of U.S. 
monetary policy. But they also argue that it contains additional information that may affect global asset prices, 
such as investor sentiment and risk appetite. Based on this, we include the VIX in the exogenous block of the 
model. 
6 Throughout the paper we focus on models’ cumulative impulse response functions after 12 months to allow 
transmission to be fully realized. 
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Table 1. Cumulative impulse response of domestic rates after 12 months 
Note: The table reports the cumulative impulse response of domestic rates after one year to a shock to the 
federal funds rate that leaves it 100 basis points higher. * denotes statistical significance at the 10 percent 
level. 
Country
ARG Argentina 0.42 0.28
BOL Bolivia 0.14 0.20
BRA Brazil -0.67 -0.57 1.28 * 1.15 *
CHL Chile -0.08 0.02 0.57 * 0.51 *
COL Colombia -0.17 -0.32 1.23 * 1.11 *
CRI Costa Rica 0.02 0.13 0.39 0.56
MEX Mexico 0.89 * 0.66 * 0.56 * 0.63 *
PER Peru 0.26 0.39 0.85 * 0.78 *
URY Uruguay -0.20 0.08
ARM Armenia 1.10 -0.06 -0.37 -0.32
AUS Australia 0.12 0.07 0.79 * 0.50 *
CAN Canada 0.60 * 0.37 * 0.72 * 0.64 *
CHN China 0.16 0.14 0.29 0.14
HRV Croatia 0.04 0.18 -0.11 -0.09
CZE Czech Republic -0.13 -0.03 0.66 * 0.45 *
DNK Denmark 0.20 0.15 0.68 * 0.53 *
EGY Egypt 0.26 0.30
HKG Hong Kong SAR 0.65 * 0.68 * 1.05 * 0.73 *
HUN Hungary -0.06 -0.19 -0.04 -0.03
IND India 0.51 * 0.46 * 0.45 * 0.34 *
IDN Indonesia -0.26 -0.35 0.82 * 0.70 *
ISR Israel 0.64 * 0.39 * 0.58 * 0.45 *
JPN Japan 0.05 * 0.02 0.30 * 0.24 *
LVA Latvia -0.12 0.05 -0.25 -0.27
MYS Malaysia 0.06 0.01 0.45 * 0.33 *
NZL New Zealand 0.23 0.12 0.79 * 0.62 *
NOR Norway 0.29 0.11 0.67 * 0.50 *
PAK Pakistan 0.45 0.43 * 1.02 * 0.57 *
PHL Philippines 0.34 0.34 0.74 * 0.53 *
POL Poland 0.28 0.19 0.86 * 0.47 *
ROM Romania -1.14 0.29 0.76 0.83 *
RUS Russia -0.74 -0.41 -0.05 0.08
SAU Saudi Arabia 0.64 * 0.35 * 0.45
SGP Singapore 0.46 * 0.33 * 0.74 * 0.50 *
ZAF South Africa 0.02 -0.04 0.73 * 0.64 *
KOR South Korea 0.23 0.12 0.47 * 0.29 *
SWE Sweden 0.24 0.04 0.67 * 0.48 *
CHE Switzerland 0.30 * 0.20 * 0.35 * 0.29 *
TWN Taiwan 0.32 * 0.16 * 0.37 * 0.25 *
THA Thailand 0.31 * 0.14 * 0.77 * 0.54 *
TUR Turkey 0.24 0.19 1.76 * 2.31 *
GBR United Kingdom 0.22 0.04 0.68 * 0.54 *
VNM Vietnam -0.04 -0.04
Median
Sample 0.23 0.14 0.67 0.50
Advanced 0.23 0.12 0.67 0.49
Emerging 0.14 0.14 0.65 0.54
Short-term interest rates Long-term interest rates
Pass-through Pass-through SpilloverSpillover
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Overall, we find that movements in 10-year U.S. bond yields typically have a greater impact 
on corresponding domestic rates compared to changes in the federal funds rate (Table 1, third 
column). Indeed, the response of domestic long-term interest rates appears to be statistically 
significant at the 10 percent confidence level for 29 out of 38 countries in our sample—
roughly three quarters. The responses are also more similar across countries than in the case 
of short-term rates: following a 100-basis-point increase in the U.S. Treasury yield, roughly 
two-thirds of these countries exhibit a cumulative response in the range of 50 to 80 basis 
points. Notable exceptions where pass-through exceeds one-to-one include Turkey, with a 
response of 176 basis points, followed by Brazil and Colombia with roughly 128 basis points. 
Overall, the median pass-through to long-term rates for advanced economies is 67 basis 
points, and 65 basis points for emerging economies. 
IV. WHAT CAN BE EXPECTED FROM U.S. MONETARY POLICY NORMALIZATION?
The analysis presented so far reflects overall historical responses of domestic interest rates to 
movements in U.S. interest rates. Some of these movements in U.S. interest rates reflected 
the Federal Reserve’s usual response to changes in economic conditions. For instance, rates 
tend to be increased when aggregate demand is seen to be putting upward pressure on prices. 
In contrast, others might not reflect a change in the economic outlook, or could deviate from 
the central bank’s historical reaction function. These movements are more likely to surprise 
financial markets, and may also trigger a change in uncertainty regarding the future path of 
monetary policy or price inflation. 
The effects on domestic interest rates are likely to depend on the underlying reason for the 
change in U.S. rates. Noting that the normalization of U.S. monetary policy reflects the 
ongoing recovery of the U.S. economy following the global financial crisis, some observers 
have predicted that its impacts will be small. As alluded to previously, other aspects of the 
current environment raise important questions. For instance, will normalization be attenuated 
by accommodative monetary policy in other major advanced economies? Will the term 
premium remain compressed? In this section, we attempt to shed light on these issues. 
Do the nature and source of global financial shocks matter? 
As Romer and Romer (2004) demonstrate, the impact of U.S. interest rate movements on the 
real economy depends on the underlying developments behind these decisions. Bluedorn and 
Bowdler (2010) show that the degree to which FOMC announcements are anticipated by 
markets has a bearing on the transmission of U.S. monetary policy to asset prices in other 
countries. The impact of a Federal Reserve policy decision will likely differ if it responds to 
a better economic outlook or reflects tighter monetary conditions alone. One reason is that 
decisions responding to an improved economic outlook are easier to anticipate, and may 
already be priced in by financial markets before they occur. An unanticipated rate hike, in 
turn, is likely to generate sharper adjustments of asset prices than one that has been fully 
anticipated. Another channel is that the better U.S. outlook will itself have implications for 
many global variables, including demand for exports and commodity prices, which will 
affect countries differently.  
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Figure 2: Drivers of long-term interest rates, 2000-15: Expected and unexpected shocks to 
10-year bond yields in the U.S. and the euro area 
A. All shocks 
B. Money versus real shocks 
Source: IMF staff calculations. 
Note: The bars denote the variance decomposition (in percent) of domestic long-term interest rates 
attributable to expected (“Real”) and unexpected (“Money”) changes in 10-year U.S. bond yields (“US”) 
and in euro area 10-year bond yields (“EA”); and global risk sentiment, as proxied by the VIX index. The 
shock decomposition and identification are based on Osorio-Buitron and Vesperoni (2015). 
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To better understand the impact of anticipated versus unanticipated shocks to interest rates, 
we consider the decomposition of movements in U.S. and euro area 10-year bond yields 
constructed by Osorio-Buitron and Vesperoni (2015). Their identification strategy 
distinguishes between movements in rates that respond to global risk aversion, unexpected 
monetary tightening, or an improved economic outlook in the two economies. The 
identification of shocks is based on the sign restriction approach proposed by Matheson and 
Stavrev (2014) for U.S.-based shocks, and has been further extended by Osorio-Buitron and 
Vesperoni (2015) in two important ways. First, they orthogonalize their identified shocks to 
shifts in global risk aversion, proxied by the VIX index. Second, they expand the model and 
sign restrictions to include euro area yields—constructed as PPP-GDP weighted-average of 
10 year bonds issued by France, Germany, Italy, and Spain—and stock returns. The sign 
restrictions are used to identify “real” shocks, which raise bond yields and depress stock 
prices, and “money” shocks, which depress both yields and stock prices. Additional sign 
restrictions distinguish the money and real shocks generated in the United States from those 
generated in the euro area, by assuming that contemporaneous shocks from the United States 
Figure 2: Drivers of long-term interest rates, 2000-15: Expected and unexpected shocks 
to 10-year bond yields in the U.S. and the euro area (continued) 
C. Shocks originating in U.S. and euro area 
Source: IMF staff calculations. 
Note: The bars denote the variance decomposition (in percent) of domestic long-term interest rates 
attributable to changes in 10-year U.S. bond yields (“US”) and in euro area 10-year bond yields (“EA”); 
and global risk sentiment, as proxied by the VIX index. The shock decomposition and identification are 
based on Osorio-Buitron and Vesperoni (2015). 
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can affect euro area variables but not the other way around. The shocks attributable to these 
different drivers of long-term yields are orthogonal by construction.7 This decomposition will 
enable us to characterize the response of domestic interest rates to four sets of shocks that are 
in line with economic developments or that deviate from them, and that originate in the 
United States or in the euro area. 
The identification of these shocks is distinct from the strategy employed by the high-
frequency event window approach used by Karadi and Gertler (2015) and Gilchrist, López-
Salido and Zakrajsek (2015), which measures the surprise element of FOMC decisions using 
intraday market data surrounding policy meetings. Still, “money” shocks are likely to be less 
anticipated by markets than their “real” counterparts, to the extent that the central bank and 
private agents likely share common information about the economic determinants that drive 
monetary policy decisions. 
We conduct the same exercise described in the previous section, but replace the foreign 
interest rate ∆݅∗ in the vector ࢠ∗ with the five identified drivers of global long-term rates, and 
include domestic long-term government bond yields in the domestic block. We focus on the 
29 countries that showed a significant pass-through to domestic long-term interest rates at the 
10 percent confidence level (as reported in Table 1, column 3). Figure 2, Panel A, reports the 
share of variation in domestic long-term interest rates that can be attributed to each of these 
drivers; Panel B distinguishes between “money” and “real” shocks; whereas Panel C 
distinguishes between shocks originating in the United States and the euro area. 
The first result that stands out is that money shocks significantly affect bond yields around 
the world (Panel B). Indeed, movements in global long-term rates that are driven by an 
unexpected monetary tightening (“money” shocks) explain a larger fraction of the variability 
in domestic rates than those driven by an improved economic outlook (“real” shocks). The 
contribution from monetary surprises among the external factors excluding the VIX is over 
70 percent in advanced economies and 60 percent in emerging economies, and is larger than 
the contribution from “real” shocks in 80 percent of the countries.  
Another important feature at the current juncture is that the United States is set to continue 
normalizing its monetary policy while other major economies, such as the euro area and 
Japan, maintain a highly accommodative stance. An interesting question in this context is 
how much of an attenuating effect this asynchronicity of monetary policies will provide for 
other economies. 
7 Note however that while the identification strategy cannot distinguish between monetary policy shocks and 
inflationary surprises, our interest is in distinguishing expected interest rate movements associated with changes 
in the economic outlook. 
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The results shown in Panel C suggest that the relief most countries may receive from further 
monetary easing by the ECB will be limited, as movements in U.S. rates are the main source 
of global financial shocks. Indeed, the share of total variation in domestic bond yields 
attributable to U.S. shocks is larger than the share corresponding to euro area shocks in most 
of the countries in our sample, and is particularly large for countries such as Australia, 
Canada, and South Korea. The few cases where shocks originating in both economies 
represent roughly the same contribution comprise the Czech Republic, India, Israel, Pakistan, 
and South Africa. The share of the variance explained by U.S.-originated shocks exceeds the 
share corresponding to euro area shocks in 93 percent of the countries. On average, they 
account for around 70 percent or the variability attributable to external factors (excluding the 
VIX) in advanced economies, and just over 60 percent in emerging economies.
Figure 3: Impact on long-term interest rates: Expected and unexpected shocks to 10-year 
bond yields in the U.S. and the euro area 
Source: IMF staff calculations. 
Notes: The chart shows the cumulative response of domestic long-term interest rates after 12 months to an 
identified shock attributable to expected (“Real”) and unexpected (“Money”) changes in 10-year U.S. bond 
yields (“US”) and in euro area 10-year bond yields (“EA”). The responses to the “Money US” and “Real EA” 
in the case of Turkey (TUR), Indonesia (IDN), and Pakistan (PAK) are shown on the right scale; all other 
responses are plotted against the left scale. The model also includes a shock to global risk sentiment, proxied 
by the VIX index; the corresponding cumulative response is not shown here owing to space considerations.  
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It is worth noting that idiosyncratic factors still explain a large fraction of interest rate 
movements in emerging economies. For instance, in Canada, Denmark, Norway, Sweden and 
the United Kingdom the five external factors included in our model explain over two thirds 
of the overall variance in domestic long-term rates, but these factors explain less than 25 
percent of the variance in the case of Chile, India, Pakistan, Philippines, Thailand, and 
Turkey. 
This analysis of the relative importance of each underlying shock to foreign long-term rates 
is based on a variance decomposition exercise. The advantage of such an approach is that it 
takes into account not only the estimated impact of each shock when it occurs, but also how 
often and large those shocks have been in the past. A complementary exercise is to estimate 
the impact of an identified shock of a given magnitude, irrespective of how likely it is to 
occur: the impulse responses of domestic long-term interest rates to each shock are reported 
in Figure 3. A few interesting observations can be gleaned from this exercise. The responses 
of domestic interest rates to unanticipated U.S. monetary shocks tend to be large and positive 
for most countries, and tend to outweigh those that accompany good economic news. These 
are particularly large for Indonesia, Pakistan, and Turkey. In the case of the response to euro 
area shocks, Pakistan and Poland tend to exhibit the largest responses. 
Assessing the effects of shocks to the term premium 
Another potential source of risk surrounding the normalization of U.S. monetary policy is a 
sudden decompression of the term premium—that is, the difference between the 10-year 
yield and the average of expected future short-term rates over the same horizon—which is 
currently at historically low levels.8 
To assess the potential impact of a rise in the term premium, we include the decomposition of 
the 10-year U.S. Treasury bond yield into the expected path of short-term interest rates and 
the term premium as exogenous variables in our workhorse country-specific VAR models. 
The estimates of the U.S. term premium and the expected path of short-term interest rates are 
produced by Adrian, Crump, and Moench (2013) and maintained by the Federal Reserve 
Bank of New York, and have been reported in Figure 1, panel B. Results from this exercise 
are presented in Figures 4 and 5.  
8 The term premium can be thought of as the extra return investors require to hold a longer-dated bond instead 
of investing in a series of short-term securities, and is thought to reflect their uncertainty about the future path of 
interest rates as well as their degree of risk aversion. As such, movements in the term premium tend to be 
closely correlated with risk premiums on other assets in global financial markets.  
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Our results confirm that movements in the term premium are a major source of spillovers 
from U.S. long-term interest rates. On average, we find that shocks to the U.S. term premium 
account for about three-quarters of the variance in domestic long-term rates attributable to 
shocks to U.S. rates (Figure 4), both in advanced and emerging economies. This share is as 
high as 90 percent for Chile, Indonesia, Israel, Pakistan, and Peru (although the contribution 
to the overall variance stemming from idiosyncratic factors tends to be large in these 
countries). In Canada, the same share is about 77 percent, but the U.S. term premium alone 
explains almost 60 percent of the entire variance of long-term Canadian bond yields. Finally, 
although these external factors explain a relatively small share of the variance in domestic 
interest rates in Turkey, the cumulative response of domestic interest rates to a shock to the 
U.S. term premium tends to be fairly large in that country (Figure 5). 
Figure 4: Drivers of long-term interest rates, 2000-15: U.S. term premium, the expected 
path of U.S. monetary policy, and global risk sentiment 
Source: IMF staff calculations. 
Note: The bars denote the variance decomposition (in percent) of domestic long-term interest rates 
attributable to changes in the expected path of U.S. short-term interest rates (“Expected Path”), term 
premium, and global risk sentiment, as proxied by the VIX index. The Term Premium estimates are 
produced by Adrian, Crump and Moench (2013), and maintained by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. 
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V.   THE FED’S NORMALIZATION AND MONETARY AUTONOMY ELSEWHERE 
While global financial conditions are expected to tighten as the Federal Reserve continues 
normalizing its monetary stance, many economies around the world are facing a deceleration 
in economic activity. Where weak demand is generating negative output gaps and inflation 
expectations remain well-anchored, supportive monetary conditions are likely to be 
appropriate. How much monetary leeway do these countries have to avoid an unwanted 
tightening of financial conditions? While interest rate pass-through at the long end of the 
yield curve appears widespread, can central banks tailor their short-term policy rates to 
domestic conditions? Or do they need to follow the interest rate path set by the Federal 
Reserve, even if that implies implementing pro-cyclical policy? Section III showed that there 
is a substantial pass-through of U.S. to domestic short-term interest rates in many countries. 
But is this co-movement of interest rates reflecting a lack of monetary autonomy? Or is it 
simply a natural consequence of central banks reacting to highly synchronized 
macroeconomic conditions? 
Figure 5: Impact on long-term interest rates: U.S. term premium, the expected path of U.S. 
monetary policy, and global risk sentiment 
Source: IMF staff calculations. 
Note: The chart shows the cumulative response of domestic long-term interest rates after 12 months to an 
identified shock attributable to changes in the expected path of U.S. short-term interest rates (“Expected Path”), 
and in the term premium. The model also includes a shock to global risk sentiment, proxied by the VIX index; 
the corresponding cumulative response is not shown here owing to space considerations. The term premium 
estimates are produced by Adrian, Crump and Moench (2013), and maintained by the Federal Reserve Bank of 
New York. 
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From interest rate pass-through to autonomy-impairing spillovers 
To explore how the degree of synchronicity of interest rates across countries compares with 
that of macroeconomic conditions, we use a principal component analysis of output growth, 
price inflation, and interest rates for a large set of countries. For each of these series, we 
explore the correlation of individual country series with the global factor. The global factor 
(or component) of short-term and long-term interest rates, real output growth and CPI 
inflation corresponds to the principal component of the time-series of each variable across 
countries.9 
Short-term interest rates from both advanced and emerging market economies exhibit a 
positive correlation with the global component in most countries (Figure 6). The co-
movement over the past decade has been particularly strong among advanced economies, 
with an average correlation of about 0.9. Yet, a relatively high degree of co-movement with 
the global component is also observed for interest rates in emerging markets, with an average 
correlation of 0.7 for the financially integrated economies in Asia, Eastern Europe and Latin 
America. 
This synchronicity of interest rates may simply reflect a high degree of co-movement in 
business cycles across countries. Indeed, all countries in our sample exhibit a positive 
correlation of real GDP growth with the corresponding global component (Figure 6). On 
average, countries that exhibit a high degree of synchronicity with the global factor in terms 
of interest rates also tend to show a high degree of co-movement in terms of output growth 
and price inflation. 
It is often argued that the degree of co-movement in asset prices is increasing over time, 
driven by deeper integration of financial markets.10 Indeed, the degree of co-movement of 
interest rates with respect to the corresponding global factor varies over time, and reached 
particularly high levels over recent years (Figure 7). However, these fluctuations tend to 
mimic the variations in synchronization of business cycles across countries.  
9 The principal component is the linear combination of those series that captures the maximum variance in the 
available data. 
10 See, for instance, Obstfeld, Shambaugh, and Taylor (2010) and Rey (2015). 
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There may be nothing inherently undesirable about domestic financial conditions being 
synchronized with those of international financial markets. For instance, countries with 
strong trade and financial linkages to the United States—such as Canada and Mexico—will 
tend to have an economic cycle that is highly synchronized with the U.S. cycle. In such 
cases, changes in domestic financial conditions may be broadly aligned with U.S. financial 
conditions, without posing challenges to achieving price and output stabilization objectives. 
A tension could emerge, however, in a case where domestic financial conditions are driven 
by foreign conditions that are out of sync with the domestic business cycle.  
Figure 6: Synchronicity of global output and interest rate cycles across countries. 
Correlation of real GDP growth (vertical axis) and short-term interest rates  
(horizontal axis), each against its corresponding "global component" 
Sources: IMF staff calculations based on data from International Financial Statistics.  
Note: Advanced economies include Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, 
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hong Kong SAR, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Malta, 
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Singapore, Slovenia, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland., Taiwan POC, U.K., and U.S., Emerging market economies include Albania, Argentina, 
Armenia, Bangladesh, Bolivia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Croatia, Egypt, El 
Salvador, Honduras, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Kenya, Malaysia, Mexico, Pakistan, Paraguay, Peru, 
Philippines, Poland, Romania, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Thailand, Turkey, Uruguay, and 
Vietnam. For each variable, the “global component”, derived from principal component analysis, is 
computed as the first principal component for all the economies in our sample. 
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To distinguish between these cases, we follow the procedure proposed in Caceres, Carrière-
Swallow, and Gruss (2016) for a sample of 43 countries since the early 2000s. Autonomy-
impairing spillovers from U.S. interest rates are those movements in domestic short-term 
interest rates that are triggered by movements in U.S. rates but are unaligned with domestic 
monetary objectives. A significant spillover estimate can thus be interpreted as evidence that 
monetary policy in that country is constrained to some extent by foreign developments, and 
monetary autonomy limited. 
In order to partial out the systematic policy response to changes in domestic macroeconomic 
conditions, a two-stage estimation of VAR models is used (see Annex A for more details). In 
the first stage, the procedure imposes the benchmark null hypothesis that the central bank 
Figure 7: Evolution of correlation with global component 
Sources: IMF staff calculations based on data from International Financial Statistics.  
Note: “LAC” includes: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Mexico, Peru, and 
Uruguay. “Asia” includes: Bangladesh, China, Hong Kong SAR, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, 
Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan POC, Thailand, and Vietnam. “Africa”: Kenya and South Africa. “Other 
advanced” includes Australia, Canada, Denmark, Iceland, Israel, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, 
Switzerland, United Kingdom, and United States. For each variable, the global component is computed as 
the first principal component for all the economies in our sample. 
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exclusively pursues the objectives of stabilizing domestic output and prices. More precisely, 
a Taylor-type rule for the dynamic relationship between domestic interest rates and domestic 
macro conditions is estimated for each country. Each country-specific VAR model includes 
changes in the nominal domestic short-term interest rate and a vector of variables capturing 
changes in domestic macroeconomic conditions.11  
We include forward-looking variables rather than actual outcomes of output and inflation in 
the vector of domestic macroeconomic conditions. Many studies have used current and 
lagged values of consumer price inflation and output growth to control for domestic 
conditions (e.g. Edwards, 2015; Klein and Shambaugh, 2015; and Obstfeld, 2015). While 
these are natural choices to control for the domestic business cycle, monetary authorities 
operating under inflation targeting usually justify their monetary policy decisions based on 
changes in the economic outlook.12,13  
Ideally, we would use the internal forecasts used by the central bank to inform the policy 
decision. However, these are only publicly available for a handful of countries and with a 
significant delay. Instead, we use changes in professional forecasts of economic activity and 
price inflation as reported by Consensus Economics (12-months-ahead forecasts of inflation 
and output growth).14 
The residuals or unexplained components from this estimation can be interpreted as 
deviations from the historical policy reaction function that characterizes the central bank’s 
efforts to achieve its domestic output and inflation stabilization objectives. These 
unexplained interest rate movements could reflect other central bank objectives beyond 
preserving price stability, including financial stability concerns, and thus could well be 
welfare-enhancing.15 Nonetheless, they entail changes in domestic monetary conditions 
11 We use interest rates on short-term government bonds (with maturities of about three months). Although 
these interest rates are not the monetary policy instrument, they should be closely linked to changes in the 
monetary policy stance. In fact, if changes in the policy instrument did not heavily influence these short-term 
interest rates in local currency, it would be hard to argue that the central bank can affect domestic monetary 
conditions at all 
12 Svensson (1997, 1999) argues that inflation targeting implies inflation forecast targeting, where the central 
bank’s inflation forecast is an ideal intermediate target, even in the presence of output and/or interest rate 
stabilization concerns, and model uncertainty. There is also empirical evidence that central banks do react to 
changes in expected macro conditions rather than actual or lagged changes. For instance, Clarida, Galí, and 
Gertler (1998) show that the central banks of Germany, Japan and the United States adjust monetary policy 
rates in response to anticipated inflation, as opposed lagged inflation.  
13 It could also be argued that using actual or lagged variables can introduce additional biases in spillover 
estimates. For example, suppose a given external development is expected to affect aggregate demand both in 
the United States and in a small open economy sometime in the near future, but has not affected measured 
activity yet, and both economies adjust their monetary policy stand accordingly in order to achieve their 
objectives set exclusively in terms of domestic variables. In this context, using actual macro variables would 
lead to wrongly consider the change in interest rate in the small open economy as a monetary spillover from the 
United States when, in fact, the domestic authority is acting fully consistently with its policy objective. 
14 Besides being forward looking indicators, using expectations about GDP growth allows controlling for 
domestic conditions at a monthly frequency, which is not possible using GDP data. 
15 Consider the case of a central bank that decides to increase interest rates in the face of a shock that would 
otherwise lead to exchange rate depreciation. Our procedure identifies the part of the rate increase that can be 
(continued…) 
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beyond what can be attributed to the central bank’s usual response to inflation and output 
developments. 
In a second stage, we quantify to what extent these residual movements in domestic interest 
rates can be explained by movements in U.S. interest rates. We estimate another country-
specific VAR that includes the residual domestic interest rate movements obtained from the 
first stage, a vector of global variables including changes in the U.S. federal funds rate, and 
the VIX index to capture global risk sentiment. 
We focus our analysis on the Cholesky-orthogonalized impulse response of the (residual) 
domestic interest rates to a shock from the U.S. federal funds rate. We interpret these 
estimates as autonomy-impairing spillovers from U.S. rates, and expect them to be low where 
monetary autonomy is high. It should be noted that we are not attempting to fully 
characterize why interest rates deviated from the inward-looking policy rule in the first stage. 
While a host of factors could be driving these deviations from the policy rule, we focus only 
on how much of these residuals can be associated with movements in U.S. rates. 
In general, the autonomy-impairing spillover response of domestic short-term rates following 
a 100-basis-point increase in the federal funds rate (depicted with bars in Figure 8) is smaller 
than the overall response reported earlier (20 basis points lower on average). That is to say, 
an important portion of the co-movement in interest rates is simply a reflection of 
synchronized business cycles, and thus cannot be construed as inconsistent with full 
monetary autonomy. 
Nonetheless, estimated spillovers to domestic short-term rates are statistically significant at 
the 10 percent confidence level in 11 out of the 43 advanced and emerging market economies 
included in our sample, where they average a non-trivial 38 basis points. Interestingly, these 
economies include countries with fully flexible exchange rates and well-established central 
banks, such as Canada and Israel. In economies such as Hong Kong SAR and Mexico, 
autonomy-impairing spillovers from U.S. to domestic short-term interest rates are large, 
exceeding two-for-three. This is not surprising given their highly open financial systems, 
compounded with a hard peg to the U.S. dollar in the former and tight financial linkages with 
the United States in the latter. 
explained by its concern for the second-round effects on inflation, as captured by its historical behavior. The 
remainder is considered unexplained, even though it could correspond to an explicit intent to contain 
vulnerabilities from balance sheet mismatches in order to preserve financial stability.  
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For completeness, we also apply the two-stage estimation procedure to long-term rates. We 
find that the difference with respect to simple pass-through estimates is much less relevant at 
the longer-end of the yield curve. Indeed, the response of long-term interest rates from the 
two-stage procedure (bars in Figure 9) is essentially the same as the overall pass-through 
response (dots). 
In sum, we find that a large portion of the pass-through to short-term interest rates from 
movements in U.S. rates can be attributed to the synchronicity of business cycles across 
countries. However, we also find that movements in U.S. rates generate significant spillovers 
to domestic short-term rates in several countries—including both advanced and emerging 
economies—above and beyond what can be explained by business cycle co-movement. 
Based on historical evidence, these countries seem to have limited monetary autonomy to 
cope with rising policy rates in the United States. 
Figure 8: Response of short-term rates to an increase in the federal funds rate 
Source: IMF staff calculations. 
Note: The chart shows the cumulative response of domestic short-term interest rates (green dots) after 12 
months to a shock that increases the federal funds rate by 100 basis points after 12 months. “Spillover” (bars) 
denotes the estimates of autonomy-impairing spillovers. The dark bars and circles denote the responses that 
are statistically significant at the 10 percent confidence level.  
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Robustness exercise 
Our approach is subject to common empirical limitations. To estimate the policy response 
function, we should employ the internal forecasts used by the central bank to inform the 
policy decision, but these are only publicly available for a handful of countries and with a 
significant delay. The market forecasts that we use instead are subject to two limitations. 
First, there is a timing problem because they are not collected on the day as monetary policy 
decisions.16 This could potentially bias our autonomy-impairing spillover estimates. For 
instance, an event that occurs between the forecast date and the policy decision and which 
affects rates in both countries could be (wrongly) considered a spillover response. However, 
we find that using alternative timings (that is, forecasts from the same month as the decision 
16 We use lagged market forecasts to ensure that they are predetermined with respect to policy decisions, but 
this reduces their information content. 
Figure 9: Response of long-term rates to an increase in the 10-year U.S. Treasury bond 
yield 
Source: IMF staff calculations. 
Note: The chart shows the cumulative response of domestic long-term interest rates (green dots) after 12 
months to a shock that increases the 10-year U.S. Treasury bond yield by 100 basis points after 12 months. 
“Spillover” (bars) denotes the estimates of autonomy-impairing spillovers. The chart only shows the 
responses that are statistically significant at the 10 percent confidence level.  
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or from the following month) does not significantly alter our results. For instance, in the case 
of Mexico the estimated spillover remains significant and in the order of 60 basis points in all 
cases. Second, even if timing were not an issue, market forecasts may incorporate expected 
policy responses.17 In practice, however, monetary policy only affects economic conditions 
with a significant delay. Accordingly, movements in 12-months-ahead market forecasts 
should be highly correlated with movements in the central bank’s internal forecasts. 
Another potential problem with our estimates is that U.S. policy rates have remained 
unchanged at the zero lower bound since end-2008, which is a substantial part of our sample 
period. However, most other economies exhibited positive interest rates during this period, 
which enabled their central banks to increase or decrease their domestic policy rates while 
the federal funds rate remained constant. To assess whether this is affecting our spillover 
estimates, we repeat our procedure using a sample ending in June 2009. The results are 
broadly unchanged (Table B1 in Annex B), with the main difference being that the number of 
countries exhibiting a statistically significant spillover (at the 10 percent level) falls from 11 
in our baseline estimations to only seven. 
Finally, the multi-stage procedure used to quantify spillovers in a way that can be meaningful 
to infer limits to monetary autonomy relies on an estimate of the historical policy reaction 
function characterizing the central bank’s pursuit of price and output stabilization. Of course, 
that function could vary over time as monetary policy frameworks change, thus affecting the 
spillover estimates. As a robustness exercise, we re-estimate dynamic policy rules using a 48-
month rolling window in the first stage of our procedure. The results are reported in Table B1 
in Annex B. Although the results remain broadly unchanged for the vast majority of 
countries, the estimated autonomy-impairing spillovers differ substantially in a few cases. 
For instance, countries such as Bolivia, Malaysia, and Romania now exhibit much larger (and 
statistically significant) spillover responses to a shock in the federal funds rate compared to 
our baseline estimations. Conversely, the spillovers in the case of Mexico appear to be much 
lower (and no longer statistically significant) when the parameters of its Taylor rule are 
allowed to vary over time. In the case of Canada, the spillover estimate drops by almost half 
but remains significant at the 10 percent confidence level. 
VI. EXPLORING THE DETERMINANTS OF MONETARY AUTONOMY
What determines the differences in autonomy-impairing spillovers across countries? The 
traditional trilemma framework points to the degree of exchange rate flexibility and capital 
account openness as the main determinants of monetary policy autonomy. More recently, 
Rey (2015) has questioned the dimensions of the trade-off, arguing that autonomy can only 
be achieved by restricting the capital account—although the arguments and evidence refer to 
the effect of global financial conditions on longer-term interest rates or credit aggregates, 
rather than on the central bank’s ability to affect short-term rates. 
17Under this argument and if the central bank is fully credible, market forecasts might not move at all in 
response to a shock that would otherwise affect output growth and inflation because agents anticipate that the 
central bank will do whatever is necessary to neutralize the shock. 
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Caceres, Carrière-Swallow, and Gruss (2016) argue that inference about monetary autonomy 
based on spillover estimates can be biased when economic cycles are synchronized, possibly 
affecting conclusions about the role of exchange rate flexibility and other factors as 
determinants of autonomy. They estimate spillovers while modeling the domestic monetary 
policy reaction function for a panel of advanced and emerging economies, splitting the 
sample into countries with flexible exchange rates and countries with pegs or soft pegs. They 
find that spillovers are significantly larger for the latter. Moreover, in the case of countries 
with flexible exchange rates the response of domestic rates that cannot be accounted for by 
domestic developments is indistinguishable from zero. 
In this section we explore the drivers of monetary autonomy beyond the role played by 
exchange rate flexibility. We start by assessing the role played by the pillars of the traditional 
trilemma, including the exchange rate regime and the degree of capital account openness. We 
then move beyond the trilemma to explore whether, for a given combination of exchange rate 
flexibility and financial openness, other country-specific factors also matter. 
We propose a monthly panel-data approach similar to Hausman and Wongswan (2011) and 
Bowman, Londono, and Sapriza (2015). Differently from those studies, we interact country 
characteristics with realized changes in U.S. rates, rather than monetary surprises.  
As in Caceres, Carrière-Swallow, and Gruss (2016), we employ the dynamic multi-stage 
approach described in section V and Annex A. In a first stage, we estimate country-specific 
policy rules for the dynamic relationship between domestic interest rates and domestic macro 
conditions, obtaining residual interest rate movements (ݑො௜). In the second stage, we estimate 
a recursive Interacted-Panel VAR (IPVAR) model as described in Towbin and Weber (2013) 
to assess to what extent these residuals are driven by U.S. interest rates. The framework can 
be considered as a generalized panel VAR regression in which each right hand side variable 
can vary deterministically with country-specific characteristics. The model is given by: 
቎
1 0 0
ܾ଴ଶଵ 1 0
ߙ଴,௖௧ଷଵ ߙ଴,௖௧ଷଶ 1
቏ ൥
ܸܫܺ
∆݅∗
ݑො௜
൩
௖,௧
ൌ ࢽ′ࢄ௖,௧ ൅ ∑ ൦
௝ܾଵଵ ௝ܾଵଶ 0
௝ܾଶଵ ௝ܾଶଶ 0
ߙ௝,௖௧ଷଵ ߙ௝,௖௧ଷଶ ߙ௝,௖௧ଷଷ
൪ ൥
ܸܫܺ
∆݅∗
ݑො௜
൩
௖,௧ି௝
ଶ௝ୀଵ ൅ ࣕ௖,௧, (2) 
Table 2. Country sample for the interacted-panel VAR estimation 
Advanced economies 
Australia 
Canada 
Czech Republic 
Denmark 
Israel 
Japan 
Latvia  
New Zealand 
Norway  
Singapore 
South Korea 
Sweden 
Switzerland 
United Kingdom
Emerging and developing economies 
Bolivia 
Brazil 
Chile 
Colombia 
Costa Rica 
India 
Indonesia 
Mexico 
Malaysia 
Nigeria  
Peru 
Philippines 
Poland 
South Africa 
Thailand 
Turkey  
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where	ܿ ൌ 1, … , ܰ denotes countries; ࢄ௖,௧ is a vector of controls that includes country-
specific intercepts; ݑො௜ are the residuals from the first-stage estimation; and ࣕ௖,௧ is a vector of 
uncorrelated iid shocks. We identify external shocks with a small open economy assumption: 
the external variables do not depend on domestic variables ( ௝ܾଵଷ ൌ ௝ܾଶଷ ൌ 0, for all ݆), 
implying exogeneity. 
In order to analyze how monetary spillovers vary with country characteristics, we allow for 
interactions terms. More precisely, the coefficients ߙ௝,௖௧௣௤  in (2) are given by: 
ߙ௝,௖௧௣௤ ൌ ௝ܾ௣௤ ൅ ࢾ௝௣௤ᇱࡲ௖,௧, (3) 
where ࡲ௖,௧ is a vector of country-specific fundamentals at time ݐ.18,19 This implies that 
domestic interest rates are modeled not only as a function of their own lags and the 
contemporaneous and lagged U.S. rate and VIX, but also of interactions between these terms 
and country fundamentals. 
We use monthly data from January 2000 to October 2015 for a sample of 30 advanced and 
emerging market economies. See Table 2 for a list of the countries included in the IPVAR 
model. We then estimate model (2) and evaluate the coefficients in equation (3) at different 
values for the country characteristics to compute the corresponding impulse response 
functions. 
The trilemma’s pillars: exchange rate flexibility and financial openness 
Before looking beyond the trilemma, we first assess the role played by its two pillars in our 
sample. More precisely, we first estimate the model with only two fundamentals in ࡲ௖,௧ 
capturing the exchange rate regime and the degree of financial openness—the two pillars of 
the traditional monetary trilemma. The exchange rate regime corresponds to the coarse 
classification in Reinhart and Rogoff (2004) that has been updated by Ilzetzki, Reinhart, and 
Rogoff (2009). The financial openness index is from Chinn and Ito (2006) and Aizenman, 
Chinn, and Ito (2010). 
18 Note that while the coefficients for the domestic interest rate are allowed to vary with country characteristics, 
we restrict the dynamics of external variables to be independent of country characteristics (e.g., ߙଵ,௖௧ଵଵ ൌ ܾଵଵଵ). 
19 Some of the fundamentals we use are available at annual frequency. In those cases we use linear interpolation 
to convert the data to monthly frequency. 
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Figure 10. Determinants of spillovers – Testing the trilemma’s hypothesis 
A. Autonomy-impairing spillovers under different exchange rate regimes, conditional on 
having high financial openness (basis points vs. months) 
Fixed Float Fully flexible
B. Autonomy-impairing spillovers under different degrees of financial openness, 
conditional on having a floating exchange rate regime (basis points vs. months) 
Closed Mid-open Open
Source: IMF staff calculations. 
Note: The charts show the cumulative autonomy-impairing spillover (as defined in the text) to a 100-basis 
cumulative increase in the U.S. federal funds rate. Panel A shows the response under a fixed exchange rate (1st 
decile of the distribution in our sample, corresponding to an index value of 1 in the Reinhart and Rogoff, 
2004, course exchange rate classification), floating exchange rate (median in our sample, or index value 3) 
and fully flexible exchange rate (corresponding to the 9th decile in our sample and an index value of 4), while 
conditioning on high financial openness (the 9th decile of Aizenman, Chinn, Ito, 2010, index of financial 
openness in our sample). Panel B shows the response under a closed, mid-open, and open financial openness, 
corresponding to the 1st decile, the median, and the 9th decile of the Aizenman, Chinn, Ito (2010) index in our 
sample. The solid line reports the median response, conditional on the fundamental values. The dotted lines 
show a 90 percent confidence interval, calculated based on bootstrap techniques as described in Towbin and 
Weber (2013).  
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We find evidence that supports the predictions of the trilemma. Figure 10, panel A, shows 
monetary policy spillovers under different degrees of exchange rate flexibility, while 
conditioning on high financial openness. For open economies, maintaining a flexible 
exchange rate sharply reduces the degree of autonomy-impairing spillovers from U.S. to 
domestic interest rates.20 The cumulative response after one year declines from almost 40 
basis points under a fixed exchange rate to about 13 basis points under a floating exchange 
rate and disappears under a fully flexible regime (the median response is three basis points 
but is indistinguishable from zero at the 10 percent confidence level).  
In turn, opening the capital account increases the degree of autonomy-impairing spillovers. 
Figure 10, panel B, shows the results for different degrees of financial openness while 
conditioning on having a floating exchange rate regime.21 The cumulative response declines 
from 13 to 8 basis points when the degree of financial openness moves from the ninth decile 
in our sample (corresponding to fully open) to the median, and to -3 (but indistinguishable 
from zero) when it moves to the first decile. 
Given that policy rates in the United States have been at the zero lower bound since end-
2008, we conducted the same robustness exercise than in section V and re-estimated the 
model with data up to June 2009.The results in terms of the role played by the exchange rate 
and the degree of financial openness remain broadly unchanged (see Figure B1). 
Looking beyond the trilemma: do other factors matter? 
We then extend the model to account for a third fundamentals in ࡲ௖,௧ and explore how the 
response varies when we condition the third fundamental at different values, corresponding 
to the third and seventh decile of their empirical distribution in our sample, while 
conditioning on a floating exchange rate regime and high financial openness.22  
We first explore how the strength of the monetary and fiscal frameworks may affect the 
extent of autonomy-impairing spillovers. Following a rise in U.S. rates, a less credible central 
bank may need to deliver a larger interest rate movement to convince agents that the 
exchange rate depreciation following an opening interest rate differential will not lead to 
significant second round effects in inflation. Meanwhile, countries with perceived fiscal 
vulnerabilities may be more susceptible to capital outflows after an increase in U.S. rates, 
prompting a larger increase in domestic rates. 
To explore this, we construct an index of anchored inflation expectations based on the degree 
of disagreement among professional forecasters of inflation at a 12-month fixed horizon. 
While disagreement is a function of the variability of supply and demand shocks affecting the 
economy, Capistrán & Ramos-Francia (2010) argue that it also reflects the predictability and 
credibility of monetary policy—the more predictable a central bank’s reaction function, the 
20 This finding is in line with Obstfeld (2015), Klein and Shambaugh (2015), and Caceres, Carrière-Swallow, 
and Gruss (2016). 
21 This corresponds to having a value of three under Reinhart and Rogoff’s (2004) coarse classification index. 
22 The results in terms of exchange rate flexibility and financial openness remain valid when we add at third 
fundamental to the model.  
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less likely are forecasters to disagree about the future path of inflation. Relatedly, inflation 
forecast disagreement has been shown to be related to de jure measures of central bank 
independence in G7 economies (Dovern, Fritsche, and Slacalek, 2012) and to the monetary 
policy regime in developing economies (Capistrán and Ramos-Francia, 2010). 
 
The index of anchored inflation expectations ܣܫܧ௜,௧ for country	݅ at time ݐ is constructed as 
an ordinal ranking of the inverse disagreement among forecasters (measured as the 4-year 
moving average of the standard deviation across inflation forecasts reported by Consensus 
Economics, ܯܣ48ሺߪ௜,௧ሻ):  
 
ܣܫܧ௜,௧ ൌ 1ܴܰܽ݊݇ ቈ
1
ܯܣ48ሺߪ௜,௧ሻ቉. 
 
We use sovereign CDS spreads to capture perceived fiscal risks. We find that, conditional on 
the exchange rate regime and the degree of financial openness, moving the proxies for the 
Figure 11. Determinants of spillovers – Looking beyond the trilemma 
 
Sensitivity of monetary policy spillovers to selected fundamentals, conditional on floating 
exchange rate and open capital account. 
 
 
Source: IMF staff calculations. 
Note: Each bar denotes the difference in monetary policy spillovers from an IPVAR model with three 
fundamentals when that fundamental moves from the 3rd to the 7th decile of its empirical distribution within 
our sample, conditioning on the exchange rate regime being floating (an index value of three in the Reinhart 
and Rogoff, 2004, course exchange rate classification) and the capital account fully open (the highest value 
in Aizenman, Chinn, Ito, 2010, index of financial openness). See the list of countries included in Table 2. 
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strength of the monetary and fiscal frameworks from the third to the seventh decile of their 
distribution in our sample leads, in each case, to a decrease in autonomy-impairing spillovers 
of close to five basis points (see Figure 11).23 
 
The use of macroprudential policies has been often posited as an alternative tool that the 
central bank may use in contexts where adjusting policy rates to offset the effect of global 
financial conditions on capital flows is at odds with the output and price stability objectives. 
An interesting question then is whether the active use of macroprudential policies has helped 
countries attain increased monetary autonomy. One empirical challenge lies in finding 
measures of macroprudential policies that capture not only their usage, but also the intensity 
with which they are deployed. Here we use the index constructed by Cordella and others 
(2014) that is based on the frequency with which reserve requirements are adjusted. We find 
that, indeed, moving from the third to the seventh decile in terms of the intensity with which 
reserve requirements are used is associated with a reduction in autonomy-impairing 
spillovers of about five basis points. 
 
Based on financial stability concerns related to currency mismatches in balance sheets, 
central banks in countries with a higher degree of financial dollarization may be more 
concerned about letting the exchange rate react to rising U.S. rates. We explore this by using 
an updated version of the financial dollarization index proposed in Levy-Yeyati (2006), 
which is based on the share of bank deposits denominated in foreign currency. We find that, 
conditional on the exchange rate regime and the degree of financial openness, increasing 
financial dollarization from the third to the seventh decile of its distribution in our sample is 
associated with an increase of about three basis points in spillovers associated with limited 
autonomy.24 
 
The structure of the domestic financial system and, in particular, the presence of global banks 
may affect the way monetary policy responds to changes in global financial conditions. 
Goldberg (2013) finds some evidence that the presence of global banks may affect monetary 
autonomy, although the effects are heterogeneous—probably reflecting different business 
models of global banks—and relatively minor compared to those of the exchange rate 
regime. Here we use an analogous metric that captures the role of global banks in the 
provision of domestic credit, and find that a stronger presence of global banks (that is, 
moving from the third to the seventh decile of its distribution in our sample) is associated 
with a slightly larger spillover of about two basis points. 
 
The share of sovereign debt in domestic currency that is held by foreigners has been 
increasing substantially over the last few years, especially in emerging market economies. In 
this context, portfolio rebalancing by international investors following a rise in U.S. rates can 
potentially have a larger impact on the capital account. Central banks may then need to raise 
                                                 
23 The result for CDS spreads is consistent with the findings in Bowman, Londono, and Sapriza (2015) 
regarding the response of  long-term domestic interest rates to unconventional monetary shocks in the United 
States. 
24 While this difference may seem small, it should be noted that it corresponds to a rather limited reduction in 
the degree of dollarization, from 17 percent to six percent. Some countries in our sample have a much larger 
degree of dollarization (e.g., is about 60 percent in Peru). 
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policy rates in an attempt to attenuate outflow pressures, irrespective of domestic macro 
conditions. With this in mind, we assess whether the degree of autonomy-impairing 
spillovers varies depending on the share of sovereign debt held by foreigners, using the data 
constructed by Ebeke and Kyobe (2015). Surprisingly, we find the opposite effect in this 
sample: increasing foreigners’ participation from the 3rd to the 7th deciles is associated with a 
reduction of autonomy-impairing spillovers of almost seven basis points. 
 
Of course, many of these fundamentals are slow-moving variables, and changing them would 
require persistent policy action, along with a broader assessment of their welfare 
implications. All in all, the results from this section confirm that exchange rate flexibility 
plays the key role in allowing the central bank to gear monetary policy towards stabilizing 
the domestic economy. But the results suggest that the strength of policy frameworks is also 
important to attain larger monetary autonomy, although its gains are more modest compared 
to the exchange rate regime. 
 
VII.   CONCLUSION AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
 
Asset prices, and interest rates in particular, exhibit a large degree of co-movement across 
countries, and these are closely linked to changes in U.S. interest rates. On the basis of this 
observation, domestic interest rates around the world might be expected to rise as 
expansionary U.S. monetary policy is normalized. But our analysis suggests that this 
response will depend on several factors.  
 
First, the nature of the factors driving U.S. interest rates during monetary policy 
normalization will determine the extent of its implications elsewhere. In general terms, global 
spillovers are expected to be larger if the pace of interest rate hikes is not commensurate with 
the recovery of economic indicators. Longer-term interest rates are expected to rise more 
sharply in other countries if the U.S. term premium were to decompress to more normal 
levels. Supportive monetary conditions in the euro area will provide some alleviation for 
certain countries, but interest rates around the world are typically more affected by U.S. rates. 
 
Second, the response of global interest rates will depend on how much autonomy monetary 
authorities in other countries have to decouple their policies from U.S. monetary policy 
normalization. Based on historical evidence, we conclude that most countries have been able 
to tailor their monetary stance to domestic conditions, regardless of the path of U.S. policy 
rates. But this is not a generalized finding. In the past, spillovers from U.S. monetary policy 
have been large in a handful of countries. 
 
Finally, our analysis suggests that the extent of monetary autonomy in small open economies 
vis-à-vis U.S. monetary policy depends crucially on the economic policy framework that is in 
place. Our results confirm that exchange rate flexibility plays a key role in ensuring greater 
monetary autonomy when the capital account is unrestricted. This suggests that countries 
with more flexible exchange rates will be better prepared to cope with the challenges posed 
by the Fed’s normalization going forward. 
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Our results also suggest that other policies can also help preserve monetary autonomy from 
global financial conditions. For a given policy choice along the capital account openness and 
exchange rate flexibility dimensions, improving the credibility of policy frameworks, 
reducing the extent of financial dollarization, and using macroprudential reserve 
requirements may help achieve a higher degree of monetary autonomy. However, while some 
of these other factors are highly relevant for certain countries, they seem to deliver more 
modest returns compared to the exchange rate regime. 
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Annex A. Estimation of autonomy-impairing spillovers 
The estimation of autonomy-impairing spillovers from U.S. interest rates follows the two-
stage VAR approach in Caceres, Carrière-Swallow, and Gruss (2016). In the first stage we 
estimate a country-specific VAR(p) model including domestic variables only:  
ቂ∆ࢄΔ݅ ቃ௧ ൌ ࡭଴ ൅ ∑ ࡭௝
௣
௝ୀଵ ቂ∆ࢄΔ݅ ቃ௧ି௝ ൅ ൤
ࢋࢄ
݁௜ ൨௧ (A1)
where ݅ denotes the nominal domestic interest rate and ࢄ ൌ ሼߨ, ݕሽ are domestic 
macroeconomic conditions in the small economy.  
The reduced-form innovations ࢋොࢄ and ݁̂௜ are orthogonal to lagged values of ∆ࢄ and Δ݅, but 
they are likely to display substantial contemporaneous correlation. We then regress the 
innovations ݁̂௜ on the residuals from the other equation, ࢋොࢄ: 
݁̂௜ ൌ ߙ ൅ ࢼᇱࢋොࢄ ൅ ݑ௧௜ . (A2)
The residuals ݑො௧௜  from this regression are orthogonal to the reduced-form innovations to 
domestic economic conditions ࢋොࢄ, corresponding to a timing restriction whereby 
expectations about the domestic outlook are predetermined with respect to monetary policy. 25 
These residuals can then be interpreted as deviations from the central bank’s historical policy 
reaction function characterizing its pursuit of price and output stabilization.  
In the second stage, we seek to quantify to what extent these residual movements in domestic 
interest rates can be explained by movements in U.S. interest rates. To do so, we estimate the 
following country-specific VAR(p) model: 
ቂࢠ∗ݑො௜ቃ௧ ൌ ࡮଴ ൅ ∑ ࡮௝
௣
௝ୀଵ ቂࢠ
∗
ݑො௜ቃ௧ି௝ ൅ ቂ
࢜∗
ݒ௜ቃ௧, (A3)
where vector ࢠ௧∗ is a vector of global variables, including changes in U.S. interest rates (∆݅∗). 
The matrices ࡮௝ are restricted to ensure the block exogeneity of ࢠ௧∗. This restriction assumes 
that global variables are not affected by lagged domestic variables. 
Autonomy-imparing spillovers from U.S. interest rates are defined as the response of ݑො௧௜  from 
a shock to Δ݅∗, with identification coming from a timing restriction imposed through 
Cholesky decomposition. 
25 The timing restriction is the same that would be imposed through a Cholesky decomposition to obtain 
structural impulse response functions from monetary policy shocks.  
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Annex B. Robustness exercises and data description 
Figure B1. Determinants of spillovers – Testing the trilemma’s hypothesis 
Pre zero lower bound sample (January 2000 to June 2009) 
A. Monetary policy spillovers under different exchange rate regimes, conditional on having 
high financial openness (basis points vs. months following shock) 
Fixed Float Fully flexible
B. Monetary policy spillovers under different degrees of financial openness, conditional 
having a floating exchange rate regime (basis points vs. months following shock) 
Closed Mid-open Open
Source: IMF staff calculations. 
Note: The charts show the cumulative monetary policy spillover (as defined in the text) to a 100-basis 
cumulative increase in the U.S. federal funds rate. Panel A shows the response under a fixed exchange rate (1st 
decile of the distribution in our sample, corresponding to an index value of 1in the Reinhart and Rogoff, 2004, 
course exchange rate classification), floating exchange rate (median in our sample, or index value 3) and fully 
flexible exchange rate (corresponding to the 9th decile in our sample and an index value of 4), while 
conditioning on high financial openness (the 9th decile of Aizenman, Chinn, Ito 2010 index of financial 
openness in our sample). Panel B shows the response under a closed, mid-open, and open financial openness, 
corresponding to the 1st decile, the median, and the 9th decile of Aizenman, Chinn, Ito (2010) index in our 
sample. The solid line reports the median response, conditional on the fundamental values. The dotted lines 
denote the 90 percent confidence interval, calculated using the bootstrap technique described in Towbin and 
Weber (2013).  
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Table B1. Cumulative impulse response of domestic rates after 12 months; Robustness 
Note: The table reports the cumulative impulse response of domestic rates after one year to a shock to the 
federal funds rate that leaves it 100 basis points higher. * denotes statistical significance at the 10 percent 
level, and * denotes statistical significance at the 10 percent level.
Country
ARG Argentina 0.28 -0.16
BOL Bolivia 0.20 0.53 * 0.18
BRA Brazil -0.57 -0.56 -0.65
CHL Chile 0.02 0.14 -0.21
COL Colombia -0.32 -0.30 -0.39
CRI Costa Rica 0.13 -0.12 0.17
MEX Mexico * 0.66 * 0.22 0.48
PER Peru 0.39 0.13 0.34
URY Uruguay 0.08 0.36
ARM Armenia -0.06 -0.14
AUS Australia 0.07 0.05 0.05
CAN Canada * 0.37 * 0.19 * 0.32 *
CHN China 0.14 0.13 0.06
HRV Croatia 0.18 -0.01 0.26
CZE Czech Republic -0.03 -0.01 -0.01
DNK Denmark 0.15 0.16 * 0.10
EGY Egypt 0.30 0.32 0.35
HKG Hong Kong SAR * 0.68 * 0.53 * 0.67 *
HUN Hungary -0.19 -0.36 -0.40
IND India * 0.46 * 0.45 * 0.32
IDN Indonesia -0.35 -0.12 -0.35
ISR Israel * 0.39 * 0.32 * 0.39 *
JPN Japan * 0.02 0.01 0.01
LVA Latvia 0.05 -0.02 -0.11
MYS Malaysia 0.01 0.14 * -0.05
NZL New Zealand 0.12 0.10 0.10
NOR Norway 0.11 0.08 0.04
PAK Pakistan 0.43 * 0.30 0.35
PHL Philippines 0.34 0.27 0.43
POL Poland 0.19 0.01 0.08
ROM Romania 0.29 1.23 * 0.33
RUS Russia -0.41 -0.69 -0.32
SAU Saudi Arabia * 0.35 * 0.30 * 0.31 *
SGP Singapore * 0.33 * 0.23 * 0.31 *
ZAF South Africa -0.04 -0.01 -0.05
KOR South Korea 0.12 0.01 0.07
SWE Sweden 0.04 0.06 -0.01
CHE Switzerland * 0.20 * 0.14 * 0.14 *
TWN Taiwan * 0.16 * 0.14 * 0.16 *
THA Thailand * 0.14 * 0.08 0.12
TUR Turkey 0.19 0.43
GBR United Kingdom 0.04 0.04 0.01
VNM Vietnam -0.04 -0.02 0.32
Median
Sample 0.14 0.10 0.10
Advanced 0.12 0.09 0.08
Emerging 0.14 0.13 0.17
Spillover to short-term interest rates
Baseline Rolling Taylor Rules Pre-2009M6
Country Short-term government bond yield in local currency Long-term government bond yield in local currency 
Argentina March 2002 – June 2015: BCRA 6-month Treasury 
auction yields in new pesos (GFD). Interpolated using 
BCRA 1-year treasury auction yields in new pesos 
(GFD) and 2-year treasury auction yields in new pesos 
(GFD). 
February 2012 – July 2015: 25-year government bond yield in 
new pesos (GFD). 
Armenia January 2000 – October 2015: 1-year treasury bill rate 
(IMF MBRF2 line 91160C..XI…). Interpolated using 
182-day treasury bill yield (Central Bank of Armenia 
via Haver Analytics). 
March 2000 – October 2015: Yield on Long-term government 
bonds (Central Bank of Armenia via Haver Analytics). 
Interpolated using information from 5-year government bond yield 
in dram (GFD). 
Australia January 2000 – November 2015: 13-week treasury bills 
(IFS line 19360C..ZF…). Interpolated and spliced 
using 3-month generic government bond yield 
(Bloomberg ticker GACGB3M). 
January 2000 – November 2015: 10-year generic government 
bond yield (Bloomberg ticker GACGB10). 
Bolivia January 2000 – November 2015: Treasury bill rate (IFS 
line 21860C..ZF…). 
Brazil January 2000 – November 2015: Treasury bill rate (IFS 
line 22360C..ZF…). Interpolated using Anbima 6-
month government bond fixed (Bloomberg ticker 
BZAD6M) and 6-month generic government bond 
yield (Bloomberg ticker GEBR06M). Spliced using 
Anbima 3-month government bond fixed (Bloomberg 
ticker BZAF3M). 
January 2007 – November 2015: 10-year generic government 
bond yield (Bloomberg ticker GEBR10Y). Interpolated using 
information from 5-year note yield in real (GFD) and from 5-year 
generic government bond yield (Bloomberg ticker GEBR5Y). 
Bulgaria January 2000 – November 2015: 3-month treasury bill 
yield (GFD). Spliced using base interest rate 
(Bulgarian National Bank via Haver Analytics). 
January 2000 – July 2015: 10-year government bond yield 
(Haver). Spliced using information from 10-year government bond 
in new lev (GFD).  
Canada January 2000 – November 2015: Treasury bill rate (IFS 
line 15660C..ZF…). Interpolated using 6-month 
government bond yield (Bloomberg GCAN6M). 
Spliced using 3-month government bond yield 
(Bloomberg GCAN3M). 
January 2000 – November 2015: Canadian government bonds 10-
year note (Bloomberg ticker GCAN10YR). 
Chile January 2000 – November 2015: 3-month interest rate 
(OECD MEI series 228.IR3TIB01.ST). Interpolated 
using 1-year government bond yield in pesos (GFD) 
and 1-year generic government bond yield (Bloomberg 
ticker CLGB1Y). 
July 2004 – November 2015: Yield on 10-year government bonds 
(OECD Main Economic Indicators series 228.IRLTLT01.ST). 
Interpolated using information from General Government 10-year 
Bond (Bloomberg ticker CLGB10Y) and spliced using 
information from international rate on 5-year Central Bank of 
Chile BCP paper (Banco Central de Chile via Haver Analytics). 
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China January 2000 – October 2015: 3-month treasury bond 
trading rate proxy (OECD MEI series 
924.IR3TIB01.ST). Spliced using 3-month repo on 
treasury bills in renminbi (GFD) and prime lending rate 
(People’s Bank of China via Haver Analytics). 
January 2007 – July 2015: Yield on 10-year Government Bond in 
renminbi (GFD). Missing months have been completed using 
linear interpolation. 
Colombia January 2000 – November 2015: 1-year treasury notes 
(IMF MBRF2 23360C..ZB…). Interpolated using 3-
month treasury bill yield in pesos (GFD). Spliced using 
1-year generic government bond yield (Bloomberg 
ticker COGR1Y). 
March 2001 – November 2015: 10-year government benchmark 
bonds (OECD Main Economic Indicators series 
233.IRLTLT01.ST). Interpolated using information from 10-year 
generic government bonds (Bloomberg ticker COGR10Y) and 10-
year government bond yield (Reuters via Haver Analytics). 
Spliced using information from 15-year generic government bonds 
(Bloomberg ticker COGR15Y). 
Costa Rica January 2000 – October 2015: 6-month treasury bill 
yield in colones (GFD). Interpolated using 12-month 
treasury bill yield in colones (GFD). Spliced using 1-3 
year government bond yields in colones (GFD). 
July 2003 – January 2015: 3-7 year government bond yield (GFD). 
Missing months have been interpolated for up to 3 consecutive 
months. Gap remains from February to October 2004 and from 
August 2008 to February 2009. 
Croatia January 2000 – October 2015: 3-month treasury bill 
yield in kuna (GFD). Interpolated using information 
from 6-month treasury bill yield in kuna (GFD) and 
from 1-year government bond yield in kuna (GFD). 
Spliced using central bank discount rate and Lombard 
rate (Croatian National Bank via Haver Analytics).  
January 2000 – July 2015: 5-year government bond yield in Kuna 
(GFD). Interpolated using 10-year government bond yield in Kuna 
(GFD). 
Czech Republic January 2000 – November 2015: Treasury bill rate (IFS 
line 93560C..ZF…). Interpolated using 1-year 
government bond yield (Bloomberg CZGB1YR), 1-
year government bond yield in koruna (GFD), and 3-
year government bond yield (CZGB3YR). 
January 2000 – November 2015: Government bond yield (IFS line 
93561…ZF…). Spliced using information from 10-year generic 
government bond (Bloomberg ticker CZGB10YR), 10-year 
government bond yield (Reuters via Haver Analytics), and 5-year 
generic government bond (Bloomberg ticker CZGB5YR). 
Denmark January 2000 – November 2015: 3-month treasury bill 
yield (Bloomberg ticker GDGT3M). Interpolated using 
6-month treasury bill yield (Bloomberg ticker 
GDGT6M) and 2 year government bond yields 
(Bloomberg ticker GDGB2YR). 
January 2000 – November 2015: 10-year government bond yield 
on secondary market (IMF MBRF2 line 12861…XI…). 
Interpolated using 10-year government bond yield (Bloomberg 
ticker GDGB10YR) and 10-year central government bond yield 
(Haver Analytics).  
Egypt January 2000 – October 2015: Treasury bill rate (IMF 
MBRF2 line 46960C..ZI…). Interpolated using 3-
month treasury bill yield in pounds (GFD). 
April 2012 – July 2015: 10-year government bond yield in Pounds 
(GFD). Interpolated using information from 7-year and 5-year 
government bond yields in Pounds (GFD). 
Guatemala January 2005 – October 2015: Central bank policy rate 
(IMF MBRF2). 
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Hong Kong SAR January 2000 – November 2015: Treasury bill rate (IFS 
MBTS line 53260C..ZI…). Interpolated using 6-month 
generic bond yield (Bloomberg ticker HKGG6M). 
January 2000 – November 2015: 10-year exchange fund notes 
(Hong Kong Monetary Authority via Haver Analytics). 
Interpolated using information from 10-year generic bond yields 
(Bloomberg ticker HKGG10Y). 
Hungary January 2000 – October 2015: 3-month treasury bill 
yield in forint (GFD). Interpolated using 1-year 
government bond yield in forint (GFD). Spliced using 
the base interest rate (National Bank of Hungary via 
Haver Analytics). 
January 2000 – October 2015: Yield on 10-year government debt 
securities (Haver Analytics). 
India January 2000 – November 2015: 3-month treasury bill 
yield (Bloomberg ticker IYTB3M). Spliced using 3-
month treasury bill yield in rupee (GFD). 
January 2000 – November 2015: 10-year government bond yield 
(Reserve Bank of India via Haver Analytics). Spliced using 
information from generic 10-year government bond yield 
(Bloomberg ticker GIND10YR). 
Indonesia January 2000 – November 2011: 6-month sovereign 
zero-coupon bond yield (Bloomberg ticker I26606M). 
Spliced using treasury bill yield in rupiah (GFD). 
January 2003 – November 2015: 10-year generic government 
bond (Bloomberg ticker GIDN10YR). Spliced using information 
from 8-year generic government bond (Bloomberg ticker 
GIDN8YR). 
Israel January 2000 – November 2015: Treasury bill yield 
(IFS line 43660C..ZF…). Spliced using 2-year generic 
government bond yield (Bloomberg ticker GISR2YR). 
January 2000 – November 2015: 10-year government bonds 
(OECD Main Economic Indicators series 436.IRLTLT01.ST). 
Interpolated using information from 10-year generic government 
bond yield (Bloomberg ticker GISR10YR) and 10-year 
government bond yield (Reuters via Haver Analytics). 
Japan January 2000 – November 2015: 6-month treasury 
discount bill yield (Bloomberg ticker GJTB6MO). 
Interpolated using 3-month treasury discount bill yield 
(Bloomberg ticker GJTB3MO). Spliced using 
Financing bill rate (IFS line 15860C..ZF…). 
January 2000 – November 2015: 10-year generic government 
bond yield (Bloomberg ticker GJGB10). 
Latvia January 2000 – October 2015: Treasury bill rate (IFS 
line 94160C..ZF…). Spliced using 6-month treasury 
bill yield in euro (GFD) and central bank policy rate 
(IFS). 
January 2000 – September 2015: Government bond yield (IFS line 
94161…ZF…). Sliced using information from 10-year 
government benchmark bonds (OECD MEI series 
941.IRLTLT01.ST) and 10-year government bond yield in Euro 
(GFD). Missing from March to October 2000. 
Malaysia January 2000 – November 2015: 3-month treasury bill 
yield (IFS line 54860C..ZF…). Spliced using 1-year 
Bank Negara Malaysia Treasury bill yield (Bloomberg 
ticker MGIYBD10). 
January 2000 – November 2015: 10-year government bond (IMF 
MBRF2 lines 54861E..ZB…). Interpolated using information from 
10-year Bank Negara Malaysia generic bond (Bloomberg ticker 
MGIY10Y). 
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Mexico January 2000 – November 2015: CETES 90-day yield 
(MBRF2 line 27360C..ZI…). Interpolated using 3-
month treasury bill yield (Bloomberg ticker MPTBC). 
January 2000 – November 2015: Government bond yield (IFS line 
27361…ZF…). Interpolated using information from 10-year 
generic government bond yield (Bloomberg ticker GMXN10YR). 
New Zealand January 2000 – November 2015: 3-month treasury bill 
new issue rate (IFS line 19660C..ZF…). Interpolated 
using 6-month treasury bill yield (Bloomberg ticker 
NDTB6M). 
January 2000 – November 2015: 10-year government bond yield 
(Bloomberg ticker GNZGB10). 
Nigeria January 2000 – November 2015: Treasury bill rate (IFS 
line 69460C..ZF…). Interpolated using 91 day treasury 
bill yield (Central Bank of Nigeria via Haver 
Analytics). Spliced using monetary policy rate (Haver 
Analytics). 
July 2007 – October 2015: 10-year treasury bond yield (Central 
Bank of Nigeria via Haver Analytics). Interpolated using 
information from 20-year treasury bond yield (Central Bank of 
Nigeria via Haver Analytics). 
Norway January 2000 – November 2015: 6-month government 
treasury bill yield (Bloomberg ticker GNGT6M). 
January 2000 – November 2015: 10-year government bond yield 
(Norges Bank via Haver Analytics). Interpolated using 
information from 10-year government bond yield (Bloomberg 
ticker GNOR10YR). 
Pakistan January 2000 – October 2015: 6-month government 
treasury bill rate (IFS line 56460C..ZF…). 
December 2000 – October 2015: 10-year government bond yield 
(Reuters via Haver Analytics). Spliced using information from 10-
year government bond yield in Rupee (GFD), and interpolated 
using information from 5-year government bond yield in rupee 
(GFD). 
Peru January 2000 – November 2015: 6-month generic 
government bond yield (Bloomberg ticker GRPE6M). 
Interpolated using 3-month zero coupon bond yield 
(Bloomberg ticker I36103M). Spliced using central 
bank discount rate in new sol (GFD). 
May 2006 – November 2015: 10-year generic government bond 
yield (Bloomberg ticker GRPE10Y). Spliced using 10-year zero-
coupon curve (Bloomberg ticker I36110Y) and 10-year sovereign 
bond yield (Ministerio de Economía del Perú via Haver 
Analytics). Interpolated using information from 15-year generic 
government bond yield (Bloomberg ticker GRPE15Y).  
Philippines January 2000 – October 2015: 91-day treasury bill rate 
(IFS line 56660C..ZF…). Interpolated using PDEX 
PDST-F Fixing 3-months (Bloomberg ticker 
PDSF3MO). 
January 2000 – October 2015: PDEX PDST-F Fixing 10-year 
(Bloomberg ticker PDSF10YR). Spliced using 10-year treasury 
bond mid-yield (Tullett Prebo via Haver Analytics). 
Poland January 2000 – November 2015: Treasury bill rate (IFS 
line 96460C..ZF…). Interpolated using 1-year 
government note yield in new zloty (GFD) and 1-year 
government note yield (Bloomberg ticker POGB1YR). 
January 2000 – November 2015: 10-year government bond yield 
(Reuters via Haver Analytics). Interpolated using variation from 
10-year government note (Bloomberg ticker POGB10YR). 
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Romania January 2000 – September 2015: 91-day treasury bill 
rate (IFS line 96860C..ZF…). Spliced using 3-month 
treasury bill yield in new leu (GFD). 
December 2001 - October 2015: Government bond yield (IFS line 
96861…ZF…). Interpolated using information from 10-year bid 
yield on government securities (National Bank of Romania via 
Haver Analytics) and spliced using long-term government bond 
yield in new leu (GFD). Missing from September 2003 to June 
2004. 
Russia January 2000 – October 2015: 3-month treasury bill 
yield in ruble (GFD). Interpolated using 1-year 
government bond yield in ruble (GFD) and 6-month 
government bond yield in ruble (GFD). Spliced using 
1-week repo OMO auction rate (Haver Analytics). 
January 2000 – July 2015: 10-year bond yield in ruble (GFD). 
Missing from April 2011 to February 2012. 
Saudi Arabia January 2000 – October 2015: 13-week treasury bill 
rate (Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency via Haver 
Analytics). Spliced using 12-month treasury bill yield 
in riyal (GFD), 26-week treasury bill rate (IMF MBTS 
line 45660CC.ZN…), and reverse repo rate (IMF 
MBTS). 
January 2000 – October 2008: 5-year government note yield 
(GFD). Spliced using information from 10-year government bond 
yield (GFD). Missing from August to December 2006. 
Singapore January 2000 – November 2015: 3-month treasury bill 
yield (IFS line 57660C..ZF…). Interpolated using 
Monetary Authority of Singapore paper 3-month yield 
(Bloomberg ticker MASB3M) and 6-month yield 
(Bloomberg ticker MASB6M). 
January 2000 – November 2015: Monetary Authority of Singapore 
10-year bond yield (Bloomberg ticker MASB10Y). 
Slovenia January 2000 – July 2015: 3-month treasury bill yield 
rate (Ministry of Finance via Haver Analytics). Spliced 
using 3-month treasury bill yield in tolar and euro 
(GFD) and 2-year government bond yield in euro 
(GFD). 
March 2002 – July 2015: 10-year government bond yield in tolar 
and euro (GFD). Missing from December 2002 to September 
2003. 
South Africa January 2000 – November 2015: 91-day treasury bill 
tender rate (South African Reserve Bank via Haver 
Analytics). Interpolated using same concept from 
alternative sources (MBRF2 line 19960C..ZI… and 
OECD MEI series 199.IR3TIB01.ST). Spliced using 2-
year government bond yield (Bloomberg ticker 
GSAB2YR). 
January 2000 – November 2015: 5 to 10-year government bond 
yield (South African Reserve Bank via Haver Analytics). 
Interpolated using 10-year government bond yield (Bloomberg 
ticker GSAB10YR). 
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South Korea January 2000 – November 2015: KCMP treasury bond 
yield (Bloomberg ticker GVSK3MON). Spliced using 
3-year government bond yield in won (GFD). 
January 2000 – November 2015: 10-year KCMP treasury bond 
yield (Bloomberg ticker GVSK10YR). Spliced using information 
from 10-year government bond yields (OECD Main Economic 
Indicators 542.IRLTLT01.ST), 5-year government bond yield in 
Won (GFD), and yield on national housing bonds 1 & 2 (IFS line 
54261…ZF…). 
Sweden January 2000 – November 2015: 3-month treasury bill 
yield (Sveriges Riksbank via Haver Analytics). 
Interpolated using 6-month treasury bill yield 
(Bloomberg ticker GSGT6M) and 3-month treasury 
bill yield (Bloomberg ticker GSGT3M). 
January 2000 – November 2015: 10-year government bond yield 
(Sveriges Riksbank via Haver Analytics). Interpolated and spliced 
using information from 10-year government bond yield 
(Bloomberg ticker GSGB10YR). 
Switzerland January 2000 – November 2015: Treasury bill rate (IFS 
line 14660C..ZF…). Interpolated using 1-year 
government bond yield (Bloomberg ticker GSWISS03) 
and 1-year government bond yield (Bloomberg ticker 
GSWISS01). 
January 2000 – November 2015: Yield on 10-year conferederation 
bonds (OECD MEI series 146.IRLTLT01.ST). Interpolated and 
spliced using 10-year government bond yield (Bloomberg ticker 
GSWISS10). 
Taiwan, POC January 2000 – November 2015: 3-month treasury bill 
yield in new dollars (GFD). Interpolated using 6-month 
treasury bill secondary market rate in new dollars 
(GFD) and 2-year government generic bid yield 
(Bloomberg ticker GVTW2YR). 
January 2000 – November 2015: 10-year government bond yield 
(Central Bank of Taiwan via Haver Analytics). Interpolated and 
spliced using bid yield on generic government 10-year note 
(Bloomberg ticker GVTWTL10). 
Thailand January 2000 – November 2015: Government bill 
yields (IFS line 57860C..ZF…). Interpolated using 
Thai bond dealing center 1-month rate (Bloomberg 
ticker TBDC1M) 6-month rate (Bloomberg ticker 
TBDC6M). 
January 2000 – November 2015: Government bond yield (IFS line 
57861…ZF…). Interpolated and spliced using information from 
10-year government bond yield (Bloomberg ticker GVTL10YR). 
Turkey January 2000 – November 2015: 3-month treasury bill 
rate (MBRF2 line 18660C..YI…). Interpolated using 6-
month government bond yield (Bloomberg tickers 
IESM6M and IECM6M). 
February 2005 – November 2015: 10-year composite government 
bond yield (Bloomberg ticker IECM10Y). Interpolated and spliced 
using information from 5-year composite government bond yield 
(Bloomberg ticker IECM5Y) and 5-year government bond yield in 
new lira (GFD). 
United Kingdom January 2000 – November 2011: Treasury bill rate (IFS 
line 11260C..ZF…). Spliced using 3-month generic 
government bond (Bloomberg ticker GUKG3M). 
January 2000 – November 2015: Generic government 10-year 
yield (Bloomberg ticker GUKG10). 
Uruguay May 2002 – October 2015: Letras de tesorería en 
moneda nacional (MBRF2 line 29860C..ZI…). Spliced 
using monetary policy rate (MBRF2). 
